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Abstract
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), which is the primary governing
board for intercollegiate athletics in the United States, has been widely criticized for making
huge amounts of money off of the hard work and labor of college student-athletes without paying
fair compensation to those student-athletes. The NCAA’s revenue has consistently increased
over the past century—however, it was not until the 1980s that the NCAA evolved into a multibillion-dollar organization. Despite the billions of dollars in revenue that its student-athletes
generate on an annual basis, the NCAA has refused to share the revenue with those studentathletes on the ground that doing so would compromise the “notion of amateurism” upon which
intercollegiate athletics purportedly is based. However, there is nothing “amateur” about 18- to
22-year-old men and women spending long hours training, practicing, and competing in their
sport everyday like it is their job, being expected to “win at all costs,” and generating billions of
dollars for the NCAA and their schools through ticket sales, television broadcasts, advertising,
apparel, etc. The sad reality is that the NCAA’s governing board consists almost entirely of
“older white men” who are not necessarily even interested in sports, whereas a majority of the
student-athletes who participate in the sports that generate most of the NCAA’s revenue (i.e.,
Division I football and men’s basketball) are black and, in many cases, poor (see NCAA
Consolidated Financial Statements; NCAA Demographics).1 For this reason, the NCAA’s worst

A 2018 study conducted by the University of Southern California’s Race and Equity Center revealed that black
males make up only 2.4 percent of the undergraduate student bodies at the 65 schools in the “Power Five” athletic
conferences, but comprise 55 percent of the football players and 56 percent of the basketball players at those schools
(Harper 3). The “Power Five” athletic conferences generate the largest proportion of revenue and consist of the
Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC), Big Ten Conference, Big 12 Conference, Pac-12 Conference, and Southeastern
Conference (SEC)..
1
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critics have labeled the organization’s policies as racist and exploitive of student-athletes, and
even compared the NCAA’s regulation of intercollegiate athletics to “modern-day slavery” (see
NCAA Consolidated Financial Statements; NCAA Demographics). This paper discusses how
the NCAA acts as a monopoly corporation over intercollegiate athletics and exhibits
characteristics—and challenges—similar to a modern-day cartel. It argues that the NCAA’s
commercialization of intercollegiate athletics has made the notion of amateurism in
intercollegiate athletics a myth and that the NCAA’s refusal to pay a fair wage to its studentathletes is hypocritical and exploitive. Finally, the paper discusses the benefits of “fair pay to
play” for student-athletes and how social media have contributed not only to the
commercialization of intercollegiate athletics, but also, to high school student-athletes’ increased
awareness of employment opportunities outside of the NCAA, thereby generating more market
competition for the NCAA.
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I. Introduction
Despite the huge financial success of intercollegiate athletics, and the NCAA’s
willingness to share its revenue with a wide range of individuals and entities (e.g., coaches,
athletic departments, athletic administrators, etc.), the NCAA has refused to compensate the
student-athletes who actually generate the revenue beyond the cost of an athletic scholarship.
Relating this “culture of greed” to amateurism allows the NCAA to continue exploiting the “less
fortunate” while other authoritative bodies turn their heads in exchange for an annual check. As
the NCAA promotes athletic scholarships as adequate compensation for its student-athletes, it
does not afford these young student-athletes nor their parents any room to negotiate the terms of
these scholarships. When one considers the huge amount of revenue student-athletes generate,
as well as the extensive number of hours they devote to their sports, it is clear that there is
nothing “amateur” about intercollegiate athletics and that athletic scholarships are essentially
“business contracts.” Thus, the “grant-in-aid” document that high school student-athletes must
sign in order to accept an athletic scholarship to attend college is a “contract of adhesion” that is
designed to generate billions of dollars for the NCAA at the expense of exploiting studentathletes—many of whom are black and underprivileged—for their talents and willingness to
sacrifice time and effort in the classroom to be dedicated to their sport. Although the NCAA
continues to try to justify its illicit acts of exploitation under the guise of amateurism, the harsh
reality is that the NCAA’s refusal to pay fair compensation to its student-athletes makes it an
economic cartel.
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II. The NCAA Organization
The NCAA was created in 1906, as the Intercollegiate Athletics Association of the
United States (IAA), in response to a directive from President Theodore Roosevelt for colleges
and universities to develop rules to help reduce the number of serious injuries and deaths in
college football. The original IAA consisted of 62 member schools and, in 1910, changed its
name to the NCAA. As of 2019, the NCAA had 1,117 volunteer member institutions and over
480,000 student-athletes attending those institutions (NCAA Manual 440; NCAA Division I).
The NCAA’s member institutions are divided into three divisions—Division I, Division II, and
Division III—based on such factors as the size of the institution, the number of sports offered,
and the number of athletic scholarships awarded. The NCAA regulates all aspects of
intercollegiate athletics, including in areas related to athletic competition and championship
events, player eligibility, player recruitment, television broadcasting and promotional contracts,
and licensing agreements for the NCAA name and logo.
A. The NCAA as an Economic Cartel
Most people think of a cartel as a big, mean, drug-trafficking organization that imposes
its will on the public through violence and cruelty. In economic theory, however, a cartel is a
combination of independent enterprises that work together to coordinate activities and jointly
agree on rules for competing against each other (e.g., OPEC is a business cartel) (Deiter). Illegal
drug organizations perform illegal actions to climb the economic ladder and cover them up by
laundering their illegal profits. The word cartel has been shaped by criminals and society to
have a negative connotation and is not usually attached to organizations that are considered to
5
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operate legitimate and fair businesses. The NCAA acts as an economic cartel in the way that it
attempts to cover up its exploitation of student-athletes by solidifying agreements with
advertisers (and other stakeholders) and promoting their brands as a form of amateurism. For
most people, the notion of amateurism pertains to something that has a sense of honesty,
innocence, and fairness. Likewise, the NCAA promotes this notion of amateurism in the context
of intercollegiate sports to give the appearance that the atmosphere surrounding college athletics
is caring and equitable with respect to play, recruiting, and the distribution of revenue. However,
the NCAA eliminated the notion of amateurism from intercollegiate sports when it engaged in
the commercialization of these sports.
B. The Myth of Amateurism in Intercollegiate Athletics
The NCAA might have been able to preserve the notion of amateurism in intercollegiate
athletics if its move to commercialize college sports was advertisement-free, exploitation-free,
and not motivated entirely by profit. Sadly, however, that is not the case. Intercollegiate sports
generate massive amounts of income, and the NCAA oversees every aspect of this $14 billiondollar industry (Murphy 3).2 The NCAA began as an organization that would regulate and
promote fair, innocent play in intercollegiate athletics but now depends on a select few major
athletic programs and conferences to generate its vast revenue. As noted above, the NCAA is
comprised of nearly 1,200 participating colleges and universities (in 95 athletic conferences)—so
why does it exclude so many schools from reaping equitable portions of the cash flow? The

2

In 2018, the U.S. Department of Education reported that college sports programs generated over $14 billion in
revenue—an increase of $11 billion from 2003 (Murphy 3).
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simple answer is that the NCAA hides behind a “veil of amateurism” that allows the
concentration of cash to persist in the hands of a select few athletic programs and coaches that
will help keep its exploitive culture alive. The NCAA’s principle of amateurism states that
“student athletes shall be amateurs in intercollegiate sport, and their participation shall be
motivated by education and by the physical, mental, and social benefits to be derived” (NCAA
Manual 3-5). This principle of amateurism was drafted directly by members of the NCAA—
presumably, its ideal is that student-athletes participate in intercollegiate sports to obtain a good
quality education and the beneficial values (e.g., hard work, discipline, teamwork,
sportsmanship, etc.) that derive from participating in sports generally. Although many studentathletes are happy to play college sports merely for “love of the game” and to obtain a college
degree, it does not excuse the NCAA’s hypocrisy in this area.
There are two major inconsistencies with the NCAA’s refusal to compensate its studentathletes in the name of amateurism. First, if the NCAA and its member schools truly were
concerned with instilling specific positive values in their student-athletes and helping them
obtain college degrees, many more student-athletes actually would graduate from college and
find employment in corporate fields rather than risking, and losing, their scholarships by
declaring for the National Football League (NFL) or National Basketball Association (NBA)
draft.3 Second, the NCAA applies the principle of amateurism only to student-athletes while
excluding coaches, athletic directors, and NCAA board members from upholding the same

3

Under NCAA rules, once a student-athlete enters a draft to play professional sports, he or she is no longer
considered an amateur and is stripped of eligibility to participate in intercollegiate sports, even if the player goes
undrafted.
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principle. What then are the motivations for college coaches to recruit the most athletically
gifted student-athletes and to demand so much of these kids’ time and dedication to their sport?
What are the motivations of NCAA board members not to pay fair compensation to studentathletes while they (and so many other stakeholders) feast on the student-athletes’ hard work?
The NCAA has long portrayed its own intentions as compassionate and innocent (i.e., in the
name of amateurism), but its true motivations appear to be manipulative and controlling.
Similarly, the NCAA’s focus on commercializing intercollegiate athletics is nothing short of
exploitation.
III. Challenges of an Economic Cartel
A. Reducing Competition
There are four main challenges that every economic cartel must overcome if it wants to
succeed, regardless of the field of work in which it engages. First, the cartel must reach an
agreement with potential competitors, allowing them to operate at a level of production that is
profit-maximizing for them. This challenge was probably the most difficult for the NCAA to
overcome, considering the heterogeneity that exists amongst colleges and universities. Because
there are so many different levels of competition within intercollegiate sports (i.e., women’s and
men’s sports at the NCAA Division I, Division II, and Division III levels; and NAIA4 sports),
convincing the U.S. Supreme Court and professional sports leagues of the legality and morality
of earning virtually all of its revenue on the backs of a select few large athletic conferences (and

4

Approximately 250 relatively small colleges and universities compete in intercollegiate sports under the National
Association of Intercollegiate Athletics, or NAIA. The NAIA is the only other organization that governs
intercollegiate athletics in the United States on any level.
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their players) while maintaining authority over all other athletic conferences that generate only a
fraction of the NCAA’s revenue, if any at all, could not have been an easy task. Further, as
noted by Sanderson and Siegfried, “[r]eaching an agreement among competitors to reduce
competition in the sale of broadcast rights and in the acquisition of player talent would normally
also face the considerable difficulty of likely antitrust challenges” (15). The NCAA, however,
has managed to dominate the intercollegiate sports industry for more than a hundred years with
little or no backlash from its member schools or the courts.
1. Non-Price Competition
When suppressing competition, an economic cartel must overcome the potential erosion
of cartel profits through either non-price competition or member cheating. Non-price
competition refers to the use of excess profits to advertise, innovate, and improve services to
increase future profits. In 1940, for example, the University of Pennsylvania began televising its
home games and, by 1950, was making more than $150,000 a year from the broadcast rights.
The NCAA became concerned about a possible reduction in ticket sales and forced Penn to stop
televising its games (Sanderson 11). The following year, the NCAA implemented a “Television
Plan” that restricted the number of games that could be televised and the number of appearances
an individual school could make.5 The NCAA’s “Television Plan” restricted individual
participants (i.e., NCAA member schools) from exercising their own form of non-price
competition because the NCAA would not be able to “cash out” off of the big-name schools like

5

As discussed in more detail in chapter IV.C, in 1984, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Board of
Regents of the University of Oklahoma v. NCAA, which held that the NCAA’s “Television Plan” violated antitrust
laws (Edelman 79-80).
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they currently do if every school was battling for television time and marketing exposure.
Member schools that violate NCAA rules would be guilty of member cheating (discussed below)
and subject to a range of penalties, such as fines, scholarship reductions, postseason bans, and
even the infamous “death penalty.”6
Also, because college and university athletic departments do not have the ability to offer
financial compensation beyond an athletic scholarship to young student-athletes that are being
recruited, “big conference” programs have a distinct advantage over smaller schools because of
the structure of how non-price competition is used in relation to the NCAA’s marketing scheme.
When sports fans turn on the television to watch college football, for example, they usually see
teams from major football programs like the University of Alabama, University of Texas,
University of Southern California, etc. playing on major networks like NBC, CBS, ABC, or
ESPN. These schools’ football programs generate massive amounts of revenue to build up their
campuses and athletic facilities, which greatly intrigue fans and young student-athletes. This is a
form of manipulation in recruiting that creates “tunnel vision” for young student-athletes by
convincing them that they should desire to play for these big schools because they are “better”
than smaller schools with older equipment and facilities. This phenomenon makes committing to
big schools more of a trend than an accomplishment for student-athletes who believe that using
the best facilities and getting the most media exposure increase their chances of getting drafted
into the NFL or NBA. This aspect of intercollegiate sports is extremely political in that it gives

The NCAA’s most severe penalty is known as the “death penalty” and enables the NCAA to shut down a school’s
athletic program for the entire regular season. The NCAA has imposed this penalty only once—against the
Southern Methodist University football program in 1987.
6
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smaller colleges little or no chance at recruiting top prospects out of high school, which is
essential to increasing revenues for the entire institution. The University of Richmond, for
example, which is considered to be a “mid-major” program in men’s basketball, has no chance of
competing with Coach John Calipari and his University of Kentucky men’s basketball program
when recruiting players since, under the NCAA’s system, Kentucky is favored in non-price
competition while Richmond, and many other smaller institutions alike, is neglected.
2. Member Cheating
Member cheating in the NCAA takes on many forms, but the most common violations
committed by member schools relate to paying compensation to young recruits to entice them to
attend the school. Typically, it is difficult for the NCAA to monitor this type of cheating, as
there are hundreds of thousands of coaches, administrators, and alumni that could potentially
participate in such an activity on behalf of a particular school. Schools also commit this type of
violation indirectly by giving money and other gifts to relatives of the student-athletes they are
recruiting. The NCAA has employed an investigation team specifically for this reason—
however, it is still rare for the NCAA to catch a college or university engaging in this type of
member cheating. “The NCAA also relies on rival teams to discover improprieties and report
them, which many do because the punishment of rival team violations can improve the
competitive record of the whistleblowers” (Sanderson and Siegfried 17). This culture resembles
that of an illegal drug cartel in which a cartel member will expose violations committed by his
peers in order to ingratiate himself with “the boss.”
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B. Deterring New Entries into the Market
The second challenge a cartel must overcome to be successful is deterring entry into the
market of new entities that are attracted by the prospect of sharing in cartel profits. In the
context of intercollegiate athletics, this refers to the evolution of smaller athletic programs and
their push to join one of the major athletic conferences that generate most of the NCAA’s
revenue. Michigan State University, for example, was not always in the Big Ten athletic
conference—it had to grow its programs and make a pitch to the NCAA (and the Big Ten
conference) that was convincing enough for it to be allowed to join. Essentially, Michigan State
had to convince the NCAA that it would abide by cartel rules and help improve the value of the
organization rather than cause the value to depreciate. NCAA rules in areas such as the capacity
of facilities; attendance levels at sporting events; and number of Division I games played, sports
offered, and scholarships awarded make it extremely difficult for schools to enter the top football
and men’s basketball divisions of the NCAA. In fact, “only 14 universities have gained NCAA
Division I status since 2000” (Sanderson and Siegfried 19). One reason it is so difficult for
lower level college athletic programs to acquire NCAA Division I status is that there are already
hundreds of teams in various conferences that have established regular season schedules,
marketing and advertising plans, and annual ticket sale numbers that are routinely reached,
which enables the NCAA to estimate the revenue it will generate in a given year. Allowing new
colleges to join NCAA Division I competition more frequently could potentially cause the
NCAA and its member schools to lose a lot of revenue, since they would have to share the
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revenue generated with the new entrant without any guarantees that the school would generate
more revenue.
C. Inequitable Culture
The third challenge cartels must overcome is that some members may deem the culture of
the cartel to be inequitable with respect to its distribution of inputs and revenues—as they
rightfully should, of course. The NCAA only broadcasts games played by college teams that
they believe will generate revenue, which results in the unequal distribution of overall profits
among NCAA member schools. Because the NCAA distributes its profits in relation to the
production of output of all member schools, small liberal arts colleges whose games are not
being televised will always get the “short end of the stick.” This may cause NCAA member
schools outside of the five largest athletic conferences (i.e., the “Power Five”) to seek a more
equal distribution of revenue or, at least, to desire equality in terms of television broadcasting
and advertising rights. These schools, as well as the student-athletes that represent them, should
be frustrated and dissatisfied with the “cartel-like” practices of the NCAA. Greed is the only
logical explanation for why parents of student-athletes at big conference schools can sit back,
kick up their feet, and turn on ESPN every Saturday to watch their child play, while parents of
student-athletes at smaller schools must incur the costs of driving long distances or, if they are
lucky, accessing private streaming links to see their child’s games. Clearly, the NCAA is
motivated by greed and power when it comes to money, as any cartel would be.
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D. Acts against Humanity
The fourth challenge a cartel must overcome to be successful is the most difficult for the
NCAA to conquer—that is, acts against humanity. The NCAA’s implementation of “no-pay
rules” for student-athletes under the guise of amateurism, while using these student-athletes and
their images to generate billions of dollars in revenue, accounts for most of the inequality and
exploitation that exists in intercollegiate sports. There are two main arguments against no-pay
rules—the first argument is that they represent a form of wage-fixing that is dangerous to the
market for student-athlete services and the quality of college sports’ on-field product. As a
general rule, “wage-fixing involves any agreement by two or more employers to set the
compensation rate of workers at a pre-specified amount” (Edelman 76). This type of activity
stymies competition within the industry because pre-specified rates of pay equate every worker’s
productivity to the next worker’s productivity and prevents any type of mobility within that
occupation. This means that one worker may produce twice as much output as the next person
with the same job but is paid the same amount as the less productive worker and has no chance
of being promoted. Wage-fixing is illegal in a free market economy because it drives workers
away from their specialized field of work into other industries where their productivity is much
lower. Such activity also prevents workers from moving into higher paying jobs. Initially, when
the NCAA began to focus on maximizing profits in college sports, it implemented a cap on the
salaries of assistant coaches, restricting them to a low salary that would allow the NCAA to
retain a larger proportion of the profits from intercollegiate athletics for itself and a select group
of stakeholders, such as head coaches and athletic directors. In 1998, however, in Law v. NCAA,
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the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals (Tenth Circuit) found that the salary cap was illegal wagefixing because it depressed assistant coaches’ salaries without promoting a legitimate antitrust
goal (Edelman 76).
By prohibiting colleges from paying a fair wage to student-athletes, the NCAA has
implemented the same type of cap on student-athletes’ salaries that the Tenth Circuit deemed
illegal when it was imposed on assistant coaches’ salaries. The main reason the NCAA’s no-pay
rule has not been declared illegal is because courts have found that student-athletes are not
employees like assistant coaches are. Based on the amount of time they are required to devote to
athletics and the amount of revenue they generate on behalf of the NCAA and their schools,
however, it is illogical that student-athletes are not considered to be employees. A 2011 selfstudy performed by the NCAA showed that student-athletes devoted approximately 43.3 hours to
their sport each week, more time than they spent on academics and more than a typical U.S.
worker spends on his or her job” (Edelman 77). Student-athletes clearly meet the criteria to be
treated as employees, given the time and effort put into producing output for their athletic
programs. Nevertheless, the NCAA claims that student-athletes are mainly students, and not
workers, to avoid any antitrust scrutiny.
IV. The Commercialization of Intercollegiate Athletics
A. Establishing Market Dominance
The NCAA has long fed into fans’ love of sports and interest in seeing their favorite
teams play while many young athletes—particularly, those from underprivileged backgrounds—
have viewed playing the sport they love as a way to achieve economic success. So, if the love of
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sports and the thrill of seeing young student-athletes achieve economic success were not the
motivations that influenced the transition of college sports into a billion-dollar commercial
enterprise, what were the NCAA’s motivations? Considering that we live in a capitalistic
society, the answer is quite apparent: money and power. Not only did the NCAA move to
commercialize college sports for money and power, but it solidified its dominance in the college
sports industry by eliminating any organization that intruded on its cash flow:
In 2007, as the outcome of a settlement that ended an antitrust suit between the National
Invitation Tournament (NIT) and NCAA, the NCAA purchased the NIT, thereby ending
its modest competitive threat to the NCAA’s lucrative ‘March Madness’ basketball
tournament (Sanderson and Siegfried 3-4).
Ironically, the NIT had held the first basketball championship in 1938. The NCAA held its first
championship the following year and, for a number of years, the tournaments co-existed.
Eventually, the NCAA prohibited teams that played in the NIT from also competing in the
NCAA tournament, which led the NIT to file an antitrust suit against the NCAA. It is worth
noting that the NCAA’s “March Madness” postseason men’s basketball tournament generates
more than $700 million between television broadcasting and ticket sales annually, as reported in
2014 (Hobson). The NAIA, which consists of about 250 relatively small colleges and
universities and is the only other organization that governs intercollegiate athletics in the United
States on any level, also has been marginalized and brought under the control of the NCAA and,
as such, is generally considered by high school athletes to be “low-major Division I”
competition.
Solidifying its dominance in the field of college sports allowed the NCAA to experience
a “boom” commercially. Advances in technology enabled sports fans to watch college sporting
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events live on television, causing the demand for sports broadcasts to increase exponentially.
Now that die-hard sports fans did not have to spend extra time or money physically travelling to
big college games, many chose to “stay on the couch” or visit a local bar to enjoy college sports
live—rather than waiting for replays and box scores the following day. Sanderson and Siegfried
note,
While the power conferences solidified their market power, technological developments
have increase the relative value of televising events that viewers prefer to watch
live…Many fans prefer to watch a sporting event in real-time rather than recording it to
view later and skipping over the commercials (4).
It is no secret that most members of the NCAA governing board are older white males from
affluent backgrounds, while most Division I football and men’s basketball players are black, and
many come from low-income backgrounds and would not be able to afford college but for the
grace of their natural-born talent and hard work that helped them acquire an athletic scholarship.
There is nothing inherently wrong with embracing the NCAA as a lucrative, powerful
establishment—however, because the NCAA promotes itself as a “non-profit” organization that
adheres to the notion of amateurism while making billions of dollars at the expense of some of
society’s most oppressed and vulnerable individuals, there arises a “humanity issue.” The
commercialization of intercollegiate sports has enabled head coaches, athletic directors, and
others to make millions of dollars annually, while many student-athletes have families that are
barely surviving off of welfare checks back at home.
B. The NCAA’s Exploitive Behavior
Most of the investments and innovative moves made by corporations are not questioned
by the general public because they usually are appealing and beneficial to the corporation’s
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shareholders and society at large. However, many corporate actions are driven by underlying
corrupt intent. For many years, few people questioned the NCAA’s moves toward the
commercialization of big sports like Division I football and men’s basketball because it made life
easier for the general public who loved to watch these sports. Over the years, however, it has
become more and more apparent that the NCAA has engaged in underlying exploitive behavior
in order to maintain its billion dollar revenue stream that is intercollegiate sports. When colleges
and universities experience financial losses in their athletic departments, one would expect them
to invest fewer funds in their sports programs but, surprisingly, they do not. To the contrary,
colleges and universities whose athletic programs lose money tend to spend more money to pay
huge coaches’ salaries and improve athletic facilities in the hopes of making their athletic
programs more competitive and, eventually, turning a profit. The most logical explanation for
this behavior is the huge “cash cow” that is the NCAA and the idea that a successful athletics
program will not only enable the school to share in the NCAA’s profits, but also, improve the
overall reputation of the school and enable it to profit in other areas. As noted by Sanderson and
Siegfried,
First, intercollegiate sports might attract greater appropriations from state legislators
concerned about their constituents’ perceptions of public universities in their
states…Second, intercollegiate athletics may boost private donations…Third, highprofile sports programs, like other campus amenities, may attract more applicants and
thus additional enrollment, which is especially beneficial if fixed-cost facilities are
underutilized (Sanderson and Siegfried 6-7).
While it is logical that high-profile sports programs are likely to generate more funds from State
legislatures and alumni, studies have shown that big sports programs are directly tied to student
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recruitment and enrollment. Colleges are keenly aware of the vast hype that their athletic
programs generate for their campuses in all aspects, specifically admissions.
C. The ‘Real Purpose’ behind the NCAA’s Eligibility Rules
Although college sports have always been somewhat commercialized, the NCAA’s focus
on earning revenue increased substantially after World War II when the G.I. Bill, the “baby
boom,” and the expansion of television receivers increased demand for college sports (Sanderson
11). Initially, to control costs and increase revenue, the NCAA put rules and restrictions in place
to regulate member schools’ use of the media. According to Sanderson and Siegfried, these rules
were to “(1) limit the compensation and demand for the most essential input to games: players,
and (2) restrict the number of games that [were] available for sale to broadcast networks” (12).
Initially, the NCAA limited the number of players its member schools could recruit and
prohibited any compensation (i.e., athletic scholarships) to student-athletes and, as discussed
above, in 1952, implemented a “Television Plan” that restricted television broadcasts for member
schools. Money is heavily desired in a capitalistic economy, however, and the NCAA did not
expect the move towards commercialization to be as lucrative as it has become. The value of the
restricted television rights agreement between the NCAA and its member schools gradually
increased and, in 1984, in Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma v. NCAA, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that “big-time commercialized intercollegiate athletic competition is subject
to the 1890 Sherman Antitrust Act” and dissolved the contract (Sanderson and Siegfried 3).7
Although the Board of Regents decision abolished the broadcasting agreement, NCAA

7

NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
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restrictions in the areas of player recruitment and compensation remained in place. When the
latter restrictions finally were lifted in 1951, the NCAA agreed only to permit colleges to award
student-athletes a “grant-in-aid,” which generally consists of a tuition scholarship with room and
board, books, and fees—now known as an athletic scholarship. However, as the television
broadcasting restrictions were withdrawn, revenues for the NCAA rapidly increased, and the
NCAA “doubled down” on its exploitation of student-athletes.
D. The NCAA’s ‘Partners in Crime’
Despite its best efforts, the NCAA’s power to suppress the income of its student-athletes
would be substantially reduced without the cooperation of the NFL and NBA, both of which
prohibit athletes from competing in their leagues immediately after high school. The most
logical explanation for these types of restrictions by professional sports leagues is the existence
of underlying agreements between the NCAA and the players’ associations of the NFL and
NBA. While it is common knowledge in the world of sports that student-athletes can no longer
enter the NFL or NBA immediately after graduating from high school,8 few people are aware
that the implementation of such rules are parts of mutual agreements between the NCAA and the
NFL and NBA that benefit each organization. The NFL requires at least three years of college
play or “post-high school experience” to enter its draft, while the NBA requires at least one year.
This makes accepting an athletic scholarship to play college sports the only viable option for
many young, naïve high school student-athletes. When one calculates the value these players
bring to their schools as compared to the “compensation” they receive from their scholarships,
8

The NFL has limited eligibility to players who have been out of high school for at least three years since 1990, and
the NBA has restricted eligibility to players who have been out of high school for at least one year since 2006. The
NBA’s eligibility rule has led to the “one and done” phenomenon in college basketball.
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however, the question becomes, “Is it really worth it?” As Sanderson and Siegfried note,
“[t]hese professional league policies have drastically reduced the viable paid options that are
available to young athletes” (13). Convincing the most talented student-athletes to hone their
athletic skills in college keeps alive their hopes of competing at the professional level. Top
football prospects lose at least three years, and top basketball prospects lose at least one year
during which they could make millions of dollars playing professionally in the NFL and NBA,
respectively, to support their families. If the NCAA were to pay fair compensation to its studentathletes, those student-athletes would have multiple options for achieving financial success
besides declaring for the NFL or NBA draft—drafts that the student-athletes have little to no
chance of succeeding in, by the way.9
The impact of the NFL and NBA bans on younger players signing professional contracts
is even greater than it appears on the surface. By stripping high school student-athletes of the
option of pursuing a career in professional sports, the NFL and NBA have essentially enabled the
NCAA and its member schools to sign employees to work contracts without paying fair
compensation. These arrangements are beneficial to the professional leagues because they do
not have to incur the costs of putting young players through “training” (i.e., getting them ready
for the league in a short amount of time) and are able to pay lower salaries for higher-quality
players when the players enter the league. Further, it is not coincidental that the NFL and NBA,
which draw athletes primarily from the NCAA’s major money-making sports (i.e., Division I
football and men’s basketball), are the only professional sports leagues with such age
9

Harper notes that the idea of sports as an avenue of upward economic and social mobility for blacks is a myth. The
reality is that less than two percent of Division I football and men’s basketball players are drafted into the NFL and
NBA each year, and even fewer of those athletes will make NFL and NBA rosters (Harper 17)..
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restrictions. If the NCAA’s exploitation of student-athletes were not so blatant, it would be
ironic that, despite the restrictions that have been imposed on the student-athletes that are doing
the hard work and dedicating most of their time to output, there are no restrictions on the amount
of money that can be paid to head coaches or athletic directors. “Nor does the NCAA control
what an institution spends on athletic facilities…the NCAA does, however, limit recruiting
costs…to help preserve the benefits that flow to those whose compensation is not restricted”
(Sanderson and Siegfried 13). Thus, it is clear that the NCAA protects the interests of those
individuals and entities that enable the exploitation of student-athletes to persist, rather than the
interests of the student-athletes. In other words, the NCCA has systems in place that are
specifically designed to facilitate its manipulation and oppression of some of its most vulnerable
student-athletes.
V. ‘Fair Pay to Play’
A. The NCAA’s No-Pay Rule is an ‘Illegal Group Boycott’
A number of scholars contend that the NCAA’s no-pay rule constitutes an illegal group
boycott. As discussed above, as the NCAA moved more towards the commercialization of
intercollegiate athletics, just as it imposed a cap on assistant coaches’ salaries, it implemented a
cap on the amount of games an NCAA member school could broadcast (i.e., to enable more
television time for the “big universities” that generated the most revenue). However, as
discussed above, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the NCAA’s broadcasting restrictions were
illegal and exhibited qualities of an illegal group boycott “because [they] excluded competitors
from the market, since only broadcasters able to bid on the entire NCAA could compete”
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(Edelman 80). The NCAA’s no-pay rule prevents schools from smaller conferences from
competitive bidding to recruit the best qualified student-athletes. Despite their purported
educational mission, over the years, the NCAA and the athletic programs of most of its member
schools have become increasingly focused on maximizing profits rather than educating studentathletes. There are a number of schools, however, that have maintained their focus on academics
and invest most of their resources and endowments towards improving academic programs and
facilities rather than athletic programs and facilities. If the NCAA allowed student-athletes to
receive fair compensation for competing in intercollegiate athletics, smaller schools could
compete with larger schools in recruiting top-level student-athletes for their programs. This
would result in a number of positive changes in intercollegiate athletics—the general
competitiveness of intercollegiate sports would increase exponentially, more student-athletes
would have access to a higher-quality education from prestigious liberal arts colleges that
compete in lower NCAA divisions and currently are not allowed to award athletic scholarships,
student-athletes would spend more time studying and increase their chances of graduating from
college, and student-athletes would have more employment options after college.
B. The Benefits of ‘Fair Pay to Play’ for Student-Athletes
If student-athletes were paid a fair wage for their hard work and sacrifices, they would
reap the benefits of a range of positive outcomes. First and foremost, the likelihood of studentathletes being subjected to exploitation by people who have no concern for their well-being
would be substantially reduced. Second, more student-athletes would make it a priority to obtain
a college education because they would not feel the need to “stress themselves out” trying to
reduce their 40-yard dash time by two-tenths of a second. Third, student-athletes would have
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some measure of financial freedom—athletic scholarships generally cover college tuition, room
and board, books, and fees but do not provide enough compensation for student-athletes to
provide financial support for their families. Many student-athletes accept athletic scholarships
because they view them as their best chance to provide financial support for their families in the
long-run—however, because of the demands that are placed on them to succeed in their sport,
many Division I football and men’s basketball players use up their eligibility to play college
sports without obtaining a college degree and, as a result, view making it to “the League” as the
only way to provide financial support for their families long-term. Sadly, as mentioned above,
playing professional sports is practically impossible to do.
Lastly, paying fair compensation to college student-athletes would take immense pressure
off of them. Because many Division I football and men’s basketball players come from
underprivileged backgrounds, many of these student-athletes have an abundance of people
rooting for them, and depending on them, to succeed in professional sports, which can result in
excessive mental and emotional pressure on the student-athlete. Bryce Gowdy, for example, was
only 17 years old and had committed to play football for Georgia Tech University when he
committed suicide by walking into an oncoming freight train. Although no one will ever know
the true reason he took his own life, it has been widely speculated that the motive behind his
actions was feeling intense stress about leaving for college and not being home to take care of his
family. Bryce was the oldest male in his household and had taken on the responsibility of
supporting his younger siblings; it is believed that the thought of him being away at college and
living a manageable life while his family continued to struggle was “eating away at his soul.”
Another example of the intense pressure many student-athletes feel to succeed in professional
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sports is the case of a high school football player from Maryland who had committed to play
football at the University of Oregon in the fall of 2020. The young student-athlete lost his
athletic scholarship—for reasons unknown—and is now fighting a first-degree attempted murder
charge for firing shots at the boyfriend of his now ex-girlfriend.
C. The Influence of Social Media on College Sports
The media attention afforded to young student-athletes from middle school to high school
has increased dramatically over the past decade. With “social media” and other technological
innovations that facilitate posting and sharing content on the internet, coaches are able to start
recruiting, and fans are able to start watching, the most promising college prospects at an early
age. Alonzo Trier, for example, who is currently a guard for the NBA’s New York Knicks, has
been featured on YouTube since he was in the sixth grade. The exposure he received through
social media at an early age was essential to his college recruitment, as it enabled him to enroll in
some of the Nation’s top-ranked college preparatory schools to play basketball. Nowadays, an
extensive presence on social media is typical, and even expected, for most elite student-athletes
from a very young age—some student-athletes do not even make it past elementary school
before posting a “highlight video” on a huge social media platform for the world to see.
While social media exposure has contributed to the successful recruitment of many elite
student-athletes across the country, it also has been an important tool in generating more revenue
for the NCAA. As noted above, fans are able to watch video clips of top college prospects
performing against their peers at a very young age, thereby establishing a fan base for these
student-athletes before they even start their freshman year in college. The NCAA has been using
this new social media culture to its benefit, as it has done with practically everything else. Zion
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Williamson, for example, was the top draft pick in the 2019 NBA draft, despite playing only one
season of college basketball at Duke University. During his last two years in high school, Zion
built an enormous fan base through social media because of his “NBA-ready” physique and
abnormally high vertical jump. On February 20, 2019, Duke was hosting its biggest rival, the
University of North Carolina, and the demand for game tickets to see Zion play was higher than
ever before. Because of this unusually high demand, Duke raised the price of its game tickets to
approximately $4,000 per ticket—yes, that’s correct. Important public figures like former
President Barack Obama and actor and movie director, Spike Lee, were in attendance at this
specific game—all for an 18-year-old kid. Unfortunately, Zion’s Nike athletic shoe ripped
within the first minute of play, resulting in him leaving the game with a sprained ankle and
causing Nike’s stock to drop by 1.1 percent the next day, which is the equivalent of $1.1 billion
(Murphy 1). It is quite hypocritical of the NCAA to hide behind a veil of amateurism when one
18-year old kid ripping his shoe can cost the largest athletic retailer in the world (i.e., Nike) to
lose over a billion dollars.
1. The ‘One and Done’ Phenomenon and Other Employment Options
With young student-athletes receiving more media attention, the popularity of NCAA
sporting events, as well as the NCAA’s revenue also have steadily increased. Likewise, the
public and prospective student-athletes have become more aware of the NCAA’s no-pay rule and
its exploitation of student-athletes. Many of the top boys’ high school basketball players have
started to “opt out” of signing athletic grants-in-aid and, instead, are choosing to play
professional basketball overseas or semi-professional basketball in the U.S. in leagues like the
NBA’s developmental “G League.” Former NBA star Brandon Jennings, who played overseas
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in China for a year before declaring for the NBA draft, was one of the first top high school
basketball prospects to exercise this option. Not surprisingly, many high school players also
have turned down offers to play overseas in order to attend college. Canadian native Jamal
Murray, for example, who currently plays for the Denver Nuggets, was offered $1 million to play
professional basketball overseas for a year immediately after high school but turned it down to
play a year of basketball at the University of Kentucky under renowned coach John Calipari.10
While opting to play college basketball clearly worked in Jamal’s favor, a growing number of
elite high school basketball prospects are choosing to earn a professional salary overseas and
gain a year of professional experience under their belts rather than attend college for only one
year.
2. The Ball Brothers
Over the last two years, exercising the option to play professional basketball overseas has
become much more popular for elite high school student-athletes. Top high school basketball
prospects have begun to opt out of athletic scholarships, even when they already have verbally
committed to signing a grant-in-aid with a particular school. The increased popularity of this
trend can be attributed—at least, in part—to a man named Lavar Ball, the father of three sons
who were considered to be top high school basketball prospects and became known on most
social media platforms as “the Ball brothers.” The oldest son, Lonzo, played one season of
basketball at UCLA, was a top draft pick for the NBA’s Los Angeles Lakers, and currently plays
for the New Orleans Pelicans; the middle son, LiAngelo, also played briefly at UCLA but went

Coach Calipari helped make the “one and done” phenomenon popular by encouraging Kentucky basketball
recruits to attend college for only one year before entering the NBA draft.
10
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undrafted in the NBA draft and is now pursuing a contract to play professional basketball
overseas; and the youngest brother, LaMelo, skipped college altogether and, arguably, is in the
most desirable and influential position as the foundation of this new trend of top high school
prospects playing professional basketball overseas. The Ball brothers took full advantage of the
internet to gain notoriety, and their father, who saw the potential in his sons before anyone else,
worked tirelessly to generate constant media attention for his sons. In 2016, Mr. Ball launched
“Big Baller Brand,” or “BBB,”) an athletic apparel and shoe brand named after his sons.
Knowing that involvement in the BBB “family business” would make LaMelo ineligible
to receive an athletic scholarship, Mr. Ball withdrew LaMelo from high school, began home
schooling him, and helped him obtain a contract to play professional basketball in Australia. As
of today, LaMelo intends to declare for the 2020 NBA draft, as he has now spent at least a year
out of high school. In addition, LaMelo already has gained two years of experience playing
professional basketball overseas, has earned millions of dollars, some of which he used to
purchase his team in Australia, and is projected to be one of the top three picks in the 2020 NBA
draft. One incident that influenced the Ball brothers’ moves was the NCAA’s suspension of top
college player, James Wiseman, from the University of Memphis men’s basketball team.
Wiseman, who is projected to be the number one overall pick in the 2020 NBA draft, was a
couple of games into his freshman year at Memphis when he was accused of accepting
compensation from the school as a high school recruit. Since that time, Wiseman has dropped
out of college—supposedly because of the way he was treated by the NCAA—and is now
preparing for the 2020 NBA draft. Since LaMelo’s withdrawal from high school and decision to
play overseas, and Wiseman’s withdrawal from college, more top basketball recruits from the
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high school class of 2020 have opted out of signing athletic scholarships than any class before
them. Daishen Nix, for example, the most highly recruited point guard in the high school class
of 2020, originally committed to play basketball at UCLA, but recently decommitted and has
decided to play in the junior division of NBA’s G League. In addition to Daishen, the number
one overall recruit, Jalen Green; the top recruited shooting guard, Josh Christopher; and several
other top high school basketball players have decided to play in the junior G League rather than
play college basketball for the NCAA. Ironically, although social media has helped increase the
popularity and profits of the NCAA and intercollegiate sports in general, it also has resulted in
increased competition for the NCAA, as top high school prospects have begun to recognize the
exploitive nature of the NCAA and to pursue more attractive employment options.
VI. Conclusion
When the NCAA was originally created, its main purpose was to preserve morality and
fairness in intercollegiate athletics while helping young student-athletes acquire a college
education. Although the “notion of amateurism” is a core principle upon which the NCAA was
founded, over the years, the NCAA has moved more towards the commercialization of
intercollegiate sports and has implemented rules and policies to limit costs and increase revenue.
As a result, intercollegiate athletics has developed into a billion-dollar industry, and the studentathletes that generate the revenue are being required to spend more time on the football field or
basketball court than in the classroom. The NCAA’s refusal to pay fair compensation to these
student-athletes is hypocritical, at best, and exploitive and illegal, at worst. In short, the NCAA
is operating like an economic cartel and, like all cartels, the NCAA is driven by greed. In any
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event, top college prospects are more aware than ever of the NCAA’s cartel-like behavior and, as
a result, the market is starting to adjust. If the NCAA wants to survive long-term, it must make a
change—it cannot continue to generate billions of dollars in revenue on the backs of its studentathletes and then hide behind the “veil of amateurism” as its reason for refusing to pay a fair
wage those student-athletes. Adopting a “fair pay to play” policy would not only help the
NCAA rediscover the principles of “morality and fairness” upon which the organization was
founded but, more importantly, it would be the right thing to do.
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